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Caution is one of the orienting principles of neuroscience’s advance in different social 
spheres. This article shows the importance of maintaining caution in the area of 
neurolaw because of the risk of it becoming a new power that is free from ethical 
discussion. The article’s objective is to note the principal ethical implications and 
limitations of neurolaw in light of six cases in which neuroscientific evidence was used 
in distinct ways. This study seeks to examine the precautions that should be taken in 
regard to the advance of neurolaw so as not to lose sight of its emancipatory interest. 
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PRACTICAL REASON IN THE FACE OF ADVANCING NEUROLAW 
Neuroscience is now providing a great deal of knowledge about the human brain. Its discoveries 
and contributions have practical inferences for areas such as politics, education, economics, 
marketing or law. This knowledge is frequently considered very cautiously, since what it 
provides is an understanding of how the brain works at its physiological base, and because 
human rationality and human freedom are determined neither by the images provided by 
functional magnetic resonance image (fMRI), nor even by the person’s own brain. Nevertheless, 
sometimes the positions held on practical rationality in these and the other areas mentioned 
above use neuroscientific knowledge as a “new power” (Dunagam, 2004; García-Marzá, 2012). 
In other words, neuroscientific knowledge is granted objectivity and scientificity not only for its 
new knowledge about the bases of the human brain, but also for its application on the grounds 
of practical rationality. The present paper discusses the ethical implications of this approach to 
neurolaw from the critical concept of “neuropower”.  
The ability to predict the future based on “brain reading” is now regarded as fiction, but the 
ability to study and know the mind through advances in neuroimaging is increasing at a 
dizzying pace. Moving away from fiction and into the current reality, neuroscience and criminal 
justice already offer examples of the application of neuroscientific techniques to criminals. 
What is known as therapeutic justice is already being implemented in some parts of the United 
States (Farah, 2011, p. 770); for example, rapists and sex offenders receive long-acting forms of 
anti-androgen medication. Similar treatments include Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors 
(SSRIs) that decrease violent impulses by increasing extracellular levels of the neurotransmitter 
serotonin. These techniques are a result of the clinical use of neuroimaging for direct 
intervention on criminals, albeit with a preventative intent. 
Beyond clinical and therapeutic applications in criminal treatment that have already been 
recognised, neuroscience applications―above all, neuroimaging techniques―have been 
extended to the detection of supposed criminals (Laureys et.al., 2009, p. 35; Owen, 2011, p. 
135). Brain scanners, functional neuroimaging, and electroencephalograms now promise to 
reveal criminal responsibility in the human mind (Langleben et al., 2002; Lee et al. 2002). 
Given these types of promises, it is appropriate to ask whether neuroscience is relevant to 
criminal responsibility. Can brain scanners detect criminals? If not now, could they one day do 
so? When and with what techniques? Most importantly from an ethical point of view, will these 
advances continue to guarantee constitutional rights, or will they bypass citizens’ rights and 
freedoms in the eagerness to search for and/or find those responsible for a crime? 
In our attempt to answer the ethical questions, as well as others that could arise in the area 
of neurolaw, we present six cases―two from the United States, two from Spain, and two from 
Italy. These cases exemplify the different ways the results of tests applying neuroscientific 
techniques as incriminating or exculpating evidence are accepted in judicial proceedings. Above 
all, the cases demonstrate the difficulties of attempting to determine responsibility through the 
use of advances in this area of law and whether neurolaw represents a new form of social power. 
These examples show that in the realm of the judicial system and the law, neuroscientific 
discoveries have potential applications in the same areas and manner as psychology, except that 
neuroscience-based evidence, and especially neuroimaging, has a greater normative and 
methodological character. Despite the fact that many continue to believe that functional 
neuroimaging has never been used as definitive trial evidence to justify a conviction (Farah, 
2011, p. 770), cases such as that of Terry Harrington in the United States or Antonio Losilla in 
Spain show that this is not the case. What was a potential threat in 2011 indicated by M. Farah, 
is now creeping in.  
TERRY HARRINGTON AND JAMES B. GRINDER 
In November 1978, an all-white jury declared Terry Harrington, a 17-year-old black minor, 
guilty of the first-degree murder of retired police captain John Schweer in the state of Iowa. 
Apparently, Harrington and another subject attempted to steal the victim’s car on the night of 
the murder. Despite presenting a reasonable alibi, the accused was declared guilty and spent 25 
years in prison for a crime that, as discovered in 2003, he did not commit (The National 
Registry of Exonerations, 2014). 
The motive for his release was the acceptance of Brain Fingerprinting as proof of 
innocence (Peiró, 2013). This technique consists of an electroencephalogram (EEG) that 
measures one’s event-related potential, known as P300, that represents information that 
accompanies the recognition of a stimulus in comparison with a remembered context (Farwell 
and Makeig, 2005, p. 7). Changes in electrochemical brain signals are measured using a series 
of electrodes placed on the scalp and are registered using an electroencephalogram (EEG). The 
EEG registers signals that reveal information about cerebral processes. These signals are 
detected through temporary changes to the EEG in response to the appearance of stimuli such as 
hearing a sound or seeing an image. The resulting activity is known as event-related potential 
(ERP), which is distinguished from standard, unaltered neural activity. ERP can be broken 
down into a series of components that are represented as positive or negative fluctuations of the 
brainwave. What occurs before the first 100 milliseconds reflects the earliest sensory 
information. A longer ERP latency includes P1, P2, N1, N2, 400, and P300 components, so 
named for polarity (P being positive) and position (P1 is the first positive wave) or latency after 
the stimulus (N400 is the negative fluctuation 400 milliseconds after the stimulus). Generally, 
what occurs during the first 250 milliseconds of exposure to a stimulus reflects pre-conceptual 
processing, while after 250 milliseconds, it is believed that higher cognitive processes such as 
memory and language are reflected (Farwell, Richardson & Richarson, 2013, pp. 265-266; 
Murphy, 2012). 
In essence, the EEG measures an unconscious mechanism and evaluates the subject’s 
response in real time to stimuli in the form of images or words on a monitor. A series of 
electrodes is connected to the subject’s scalp and measures brain responses to these stimuli 
without the need for a direct and conscious response from the subject, thus differentiating this 
technique from others, such as the polygraph lie detector. 
The P300 signal—that is, the neurophysiological events that occur in the brain during the 
first 300 milliseconds after exposure to a sensory stimulus—supposes an extension of what Dr. 
Larry Farwell called memory and encoding-related multifaceted electroencephalographic 
response (MERMER) and indicates the information present in the brain and stored in the 
memory regarding various stimuli. This information can be relevant or irrelevant to the case 
being investigated, according to whether it coincides with the proposed stimuli.  
Brain Fingerprinting, as L. Farwell stablished (Farwell, 2011; Farwell et al., 2013), 
mathematically analyses brainwaves produced in response to a stimulus, thus determining 
whether this information is present or absent in the brain’s memory. Brain fingerprinting, as 
well as regular fingerprinting used in the biological analysis of crime scene DNA, in this case 
compares information stored in the brain with information from the crime scene. If the 
information is present, there is a neural response from the P300-MERMER indicating that the 
subject possesses relevant information in response to the given stimulus. On the contrary, the 
absence of information does not produce a wave variation in brain response from the P300-
MERMER, indicating that the stimulus presented is unknown to the subject and is not present in 
his or her memory (Farwell, 2013; Farwell & Makeig, 2005). The MERMER signal will 
therefore only appear in the P300 when the subject is the perpetrator of the crime because the 
subject’s memory would contain details about the crime shown by the brain’s reaction to the 
stimuli presented. In effect, the MERMER signal is part of the brainwaves observed in response 
to familiar information. When the brain recognises something familiar, memory is stimulated 
and neurons fire, giving way to changes characteristic of brain activity. These changes can be 
detected using electrodes, through which researchers can determine whether the subject 
recognises part of the information.  
The method’s efficacy has been shown in other studies in collaboration with FBI and CIA 
agents (Farwell et al., 2013, pp. 269-272). According to Dr. Farwell, the principal proponent 
and patent holder (Farwell, 2010), the method’s supposed fallibility in judicial contexts is 
minimal, with efficiency in 99.9% of cases. According to Dr. Farwell, it is practically 
impossible to deceive the machine because the subject does not have to respond, and the 
variability of the subject’s brainwaves is directly analysed within 300 milliseconds of presenting 
the sensory impulse (Farwell & Makeig, 2005, p. 8). 
In Harrington v. State, Dr. Farwell developed a series of tests about the crime scene and 
the supposed alibi and presented them in the form of visual stimuli to the convict in a Brain 
Fingerprinting (or P300-MERMER) evaluation. On November 10, 2000, he presented a report 
to the court in which he requested the convict’s release based on the fact that the neural 
information shown when presented with stimuli related to the alibi coincided at a rate of more 
than 99%. 
Given this report, the judge and jury had to determine whether the tests were sufficiently 
relevant to allow them to be used as judicial evidence of innocence. In other words, in light of 
the fact that the tests consisted of a series of very innovative psycho-physiological applications, 
certainty was required regarding whether the data were trustworthy enough to change a guilty 
verdict to innocent. The most interesting aspect of this decision was the required criteria for the 
experiments to be accepted as evidence. First, whether the tests had been published in journals 
with blind peer review was considered. Regarding this requirement, components of event-
related potential had indeed been published (Farwell & Donchin, 1991). Second, the court 
considered whether the tests had been previously used in real conditions and not only in the 
laboratory. It was demonstrated that the technique had been used in CIA and FBI experiments, 
which was later reconfirmed (Farwell, 2011). Third, the court considered whether the scientific 
community generally accepted the technique (Farwell & Makeig, 2005, p. 7). In light of the 
consensus within the psychophysiology community, the jury determined that the Brain 
Fingerprinting test was valid as evidence and exonerated Harrington in 2003. 
The case of James B. Grinder was radically different. Brain fingerprinting was not used to 
release him but rather as the final evidence implicating him as the principal perpetrator of Julie 
Helton’s murder. For 15 years, Grinder was the principal suspect in Helton’s murder, but 
incriminating evidence sufficient for conviction had not been discovered. Beginning in 1984, 
when the victim was raped and violently murdered, the suspect gave various contradictory 
versions of the events. Eventually, Grinder underwent Dr. Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting test in 
1999. During the test, the accused was shown short phrases on a monitor, some of which were 
especially relevant because they contained very detailed information about the murder that only 
the real killer would know. These phrases and bits of information contained, for example, the 
murder weapon, the procedure by which the victim had been killed, injuries and wounds to 
specific areas, etc. The test results showed a 99.9% coincidence between the details given as 
stimuli and the memories in Grinder’s brain, with a quantity of sufficiently relevant information 
for the suspect to be considered guilty (Farwell, 2013). 
The test showed that the information present in the mind of the accused included very 
significant details of the case even 15 years after the victim’s murder. There was no doubt 
expressed that the MERMER signal from Grinder’s brain emitted very significant details that 
identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. Grinder’s case was the first judicial proceeding in 
the United States in which an encephalogram test was accepted as the prosecution’s principal 
argument, and it helped lead to the suspect’s conviction. Although there was also evidence that 
indirectly incriminated Grinder, it was only the P300-MERMER that directly incriminated him. 
ANTONIO LOSILLA AND MIGUEL CARCAÑO 
Antonio Losilla, who was suspected of murdering his wife, Pilar Cebrián, underwent 
cognitive-evoked potential or Brain Fingerprinting testing on December 18, 2013 to attempt to 
determine his guilt and orient the search for the victim’s body. The 51-year-old victim 
disappeared in April 2012 in Ricla (which is also the name of the police case), and Losilla 
waited a month before reporting her disappearance. An investigation found evidence that her 
husband could have been the perpetrator due to the amount of time that he waited before 
reporting her disappearance and because of blood found in the family garage. Despite this 
circumstantial evidence, there was no decisively incriminating evidence (Peiró, 2013). 
Dr. José Ramón Valdizán, the former Director of Neurophysiology at the Miguel Servet 
Hospital in Zaragoza, suggested administering Losilla the neurophysiological test P300-
MERMER, just as Dr. Farwell did in the Grinder case. Although Losilla’s defence attorney 
appealed the order that authorised the test, the P300-MERMER was administered before a 
decision on the appeal was rendered. The defence’s argument was that the test threatened the 
accused’s fundamental right against self-incrimination. 
The P300-MERMER test administered to the accused had two parts. First, various visual 
stimuli were shown, including images of possible places where the victim’s body could have 
been buried. In the second test, the stimuli were auditory. Phrases about the victim were spoken 
to register Losilla’s brain activity. Although the body was never found, the suspect’s confession 
was the final evidence used to convict him. Losilla admitted to chopping up his wife’s body, but 
he said he had not killed her. In his version, they were fighting and she fell down the stairs. He 
subsequently left the house, and when he returned, he saw that his wife was dead, so he decided 
to cut her up and hide the remains. 
More recently, the “sea” case, whose principal perpetrator was Miguel Carcaño, also used 
the cognitive evoked potential P300-MERMER test. However, the objective of this test was not 
to provide evidence implicating Carcaño, as he had already been found guilty, but rather to find 
the body of Marta del Castillo. The National Police asked the 4th Court of Instruction of Seville 
to submit Carcaño to the neurophysiological test, as with Losilla. The police believed that the 
test did not violate any of the convict’s constitutional or personal rights because Carcaño had 
already been sentenced. In this instance, the test was only used as a tool to locate the victim’s 
body (Gallego, 2014). 
The use of the test was favoured because over the previous five years, Carcaño had given 
multiple versions of the events and the location of the victim’s body (e.g., the Guadalquivir 
River, the Alcalá de Guadaría garbage dump, the Majaloba farm in La Rinconada). In addition, 
the police had unsuccessfully tried geographic tracking techniques such as georadar, used for 
scanning underground passageways, so the court decided to use a scanner on the brain of the 
convict, who now must spend 21 years and three months in prison (Gallego, 2014). 
DOMENICO MATTIELLO AND S. A. 
Neuroimaging and electroencephalogram techniques have not only been used in the United 
States and Spain but also in Italy. Although these technologies were not used to condemn or 
acquit the accused in the two cases presented, the cases demonstrate the disagreement, even 
within the scientific community, over the use of these techniques as trial evidence. 
The first case refers to an alleged crime of sexual abuse of minors committed by an Italian 
paediatrician. Domenico Mattiello, who was 65 years old, was found in flagrante delicto and 
charged with trafficking child pornography and previous abuses (Millburg, 2012). The 
accused’s defence presented a series of neuroimages from an fMRI scan with the intention of 
showing that the abusive actions were caused by a brain pathology resulting from a tumour. 
This tumour, a clivus chordoma, caused damage to the orbitofrontal lobe and the hypothalamus, 
thus producing changes in Mattiello’s behaviour (Farisco, 2014, p. 1). 
However, the supposedly empirical evidence provided by the fMRI was also analysed by 
experts requested by the prosecution, who presented radically different conclusions than those 
of the defence. The prosecution’s experts determined that there was a tumour; however, it did 
not create pressure on the orbitofrontal lobe but rather on the pons Varolii, i.e., the middle-lower 
part of the brainstem and the pituitary gland (Farisco, 2013). Therefore, the tumour did not fully 
or partially compromise the subject’s capacity for consciousness and agency at the time of the 
crime. 
These two interpretations of the same supposedly empirical evidence demonstrate the lack 
of unanimous consensus among neuroscientists regarding the specific role of certain areas of the 
brain and their impact on an accused’s responsibility and decision making. It is unsurprising that 
in Mattiello’s case, the court dismissed the fMRI as either incriminating or exonerating 
evidence. Beyond that case, testing for a correlation between neural dysfunction and paedophilia 
has been demonstrated in only a very small number of cases (Burns & Swerdlow, 2003; Jawad 
et al., 2009). 
The second case involves the 28-year-old Italian woman S. A., who brought financial ruin 
to her own family due to her compulsive shopping addiction. In 2009, after an overdose of 
psychiatric drugs, S.A. killed her sister, set the body on fire, and left a false suicide note in her 
sister’s name. S. A. was later detained for an unsuccessful murder attempt against her mother, 
who survived and denounced her (Farisco and Petrini, 2012: 25). After an initial psychiatric 
exam, it was determined that S.A. suffered from some type of mental illness, but there was no 
specific diagnosis. A second evaluation incorporated the opinions of cognitive neuroscientists 
and behavioural geneticists and showed a lack of integrity and functionality in S.A.’s anterior 
cingulate cortex, which is potentially associated with obsessive-compulsive and anger disorders 
(Farisco & Petrini, 2012, p. 25). Techniques used in the second evaluation included an EEG and 
the Autobiographical Implicit Association Test, though these tests did not serve to prevent S. A. 
from being sentenced to 20 years in prison, three of which were served in a psychiatric hospital. 
Despite the neural and genetic evidence provided, the judge in the case ruled that, while 
informative, these tests could not be used as determinants for condemning or acquitting the 
accused because they were not considered tests of determined objective value. This finding 
shows that the relationship between genes, the brain, and behaviour continues to be 
controversial. 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROLAW 
After examining the six cases, it is now convenient to return to the initial question: Is 
neuroscience relevant in determining criminal responsibility? The examples provided posit three 
potential responses. In the two US cases, the Brain Fingerprinting or P300-MERMER test 
patented by Dr. Farwell was used as the main exonerating evidence in one murder case and as 
the main convicting evidence in another. The test results provided the principal argument for 
exonerating a convict after 25 years in prison and for convicting another. In the two Spanish 
cases, the same cognitive evoked potentials test, while not used as the principal evidence for 
conviction, was used as supporting evidence to resolve other issues in two murder cases, 
namely, the locations of the victims’ bodies. In the two Italian cases, the two functional 
neuroimaging tests received different interpretations from within the same scientific 
community, which caused the judges in the two cases to dismiss the tests as evidence at trial 
because of a lack of agreement regarding the accused’s responsibility at the time the crimes 
were committed. 
As a result of these cases, what does the general acceptance of neuroscience tests imply for 
the acquittal or conviction of accused suspects, such as in the US cases? What does the 
acceptance of neuroscientific evidence mean for releasing a subject from responsibility and 
decision making if the decision was caused by cerebral dysfunction, as in the Italian cases? 
Finally, what does the general application of these types of tests as an additional tool in judicial 
proceedings mean for the accused? Does it threaten their right against self-incrimination by 
granting brainwaves more importance than the defence’s arguments?  
From a philosophical perspective, it is impossible to concretely respond to the question of 
neuroscience’s relevance in determining responsibility with a simple “yes” or “no”. According 
to Vincent (2010), this question is not specific enough, and therefore, one must first determine 
which neuroscientific techniques and which criteria or concept of responsibility we are referring 
to. It is generally possible to establish three limitations regarding the applicability of 
neuroscience in assessing criminal responsibility (Vincent, 2010, pp. 79-80). 
a) Is neuroscience currently relevant for determining criminal responsibility, or will it be 
capable of doing so in the future? 
b) Are neuroscience and studies of the human brain homogenous and of a sufficiently 
uniform character to be referred to as a single grouping? Can neuroscience determine 
responsibility from a moral point of view? 
c) If not, what techniques should be taken into account when we ask whether neuroscience 
is relevant to criminal responsibility? Some techniques, such as the fMRI, only allow 
for a brain reading, while others offer the possibility of modifying the brain with a 
direct intervention — transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Clearly, the degree of 
relevance would not be the same for direct intervention techniques used in the brain and 
descriptive techniques. Even in the case of descriptive techniques, the relevance would 
not be the same depending on whether the accused’s collaboration or response was 
required (in the event that a suspect’s response to moral dilemmas was evaluated), as 
the P300-MERMER test has shown. 
There is no unified concept of what human responsibility is from a neuroscientific 
perspective. In our opinion, Vincent correctly analyses different conceptions of responsibility, 
such as determining that causal responsibility is different from virtuous responsibility or the 
ability to be responsible, among others (2010, pp. 80-92).  
For that reason, before attempting to determine whether neuroscience is relevant to 
criminal responsibility, it is necessary to clarify, from a neuroscientific perspective, the 
techniques and the definition of responsibility that are in question. 
Greene and Cohen (2004) adopt a less prudent position in attempting to show that current 
notions of legal justice, despite appearing to be compatible, are actually based on an intuitive 
libertarian idea that only considers free will. In other words, according to these authors, current 
neuroscientific discoveries can threaten the idea of free will and retributive justice. This is a less 
cautious approach, as discussed below, showing a belief that neuroscience will change the 
deepest notions of law, but such a belief is grounded in a particular conception of the mind-
brain relationship, in which the mind is reduced to brain. However this theoretical position and 
its assumptions are unwise for two reasons. Firstly it maintains the confusion between the 
empirical and the normative approach; and secondly because localising the bases of the brain 
does not allow fundamental changes to be established in a social science. 
In the opinion of Greene and Cohen (2004), the current legal system universally assumes 
human beings’ capacity for rational choice, implying that people considered legally responsible 
have a general ability to influence their own rational behaviour. In this sense, legal reasoning 
requires a demonstration of the absence or lack of this general rational capacity. Neuroscientists 
could help corroborate whether a subject is conscious of what he or she is doing at the time of 
committing a crime, but they cannot dictate a substantial change in the legal concept of 
responsibility unless they were to show that the general tendency toward rational behaviour is 
incorrect. However, if some branch of science could make such an assertion or show that human 
behaviour is occasionally irrational, it would have to be a branch of science that studies physical 
causes in the brain, such as neuroscience (Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 1778). 
These authors ask how neuroscience could help change the current concepts of legal 
justice. If, as they believe, the basis of law is an inadequate reflection of humans’ moral 
intuitions and social pacts, neuroscience could have the opportunity to change the current 
concept of justice. Such ideas would not necessarily have to be revolutionary concepts that 
solve other problems (such as the mind-body relationship) but rather ideas that change people’s 
moral intuitions through empirical brain testing. 
Greene and Cohen hope that neurodeterminism or brain determinism can become 
sufficiently accepted to question the current legal and moral concept of free will and 
responsibility. Determinism might be broadly defined as the belief that all current and future 
events, actions and decisions have been causally motivated by previous events, actions and 
decisions, together with the laws of nature. Determinism seems to be the position most strongly 
defended by neuroscience today; most neuroscientists appear to be reluctant to accept the 
possibility that something with new and different properties emerges—and is not reduced—in a 
different level of organisation (Gazzaniga, 2011, p. 158). 
According to Greene and Cohen’s deterministic perspective, the central question of interest 
for society regarding justice is whether guilt lies with the person, the circumstances, the brain, 
etc. For these authors, no guilty person is disconnected from these other aspects. Essentially, the 
justice system’s interest in “rationality” forgets something that is intuitively important. What 
people really want to know is if the accused is guilty unless proven otherwise, but it is precisely 
this “unless” where the brain, genes, and environment come into play. 
Accepting brain determinism would help to end two noticeable tendencies: psycholegal 
errors (Morse, 2004) and the belief that human beings are “uncaused causers” (Wegner, 2002). 
Psycholegal errors consist of thinking that an abnormality in the brain is in and of itself an 
excluding condition. This mistake is the reason that people are continually creating or trying to 
validate new syndromes that affect behaviour (Morse, 2004, p. 180; Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 
1778). This was also the mistake made by the defence in the previously referenced case of 
Domenico Mattiello. If neuroscience had a greater role in judicial trials, and it was accepted that 
we are determined by our brains, psycholegal errors would be eliminated because having a brain 
dysfunction would not be an excluding condition; thus, it would be commonly accepted that we 
ultimately depend on our brain when making decisions. Second, positing that humans are 
uncaused causers, following Wegner (2002), means that our actions appear to be caused by the 
mental states but not the physical states of our brains, and we imagine that we are 
metaphysically special. Admitting that brain determinism exists and giving a greater weight to 
the neurosciences in legal and judicial proceedings assumes that human actions are determined 
by our brains, which in turn depend on genes and the environment, and that our actions are the 
cause of other processes. 
Despite Greene and Cohen’s attempts to prove that the retributive character of the penal 
justice system is counterproductive, in our opinion the correct path is not to recognise brain 
determinism at that level or to think that neuroscience can radically change the concept of legal 
justice or the moral concept of personal responsibility. Neuroscience, despite its great ability to 
provide information about the brain, is still far from providing the sufficient prescriptive 
capacity to change or outline the framework for the conditions of human free will. Following 
Pardo and Patterson (2011, p.38) legal thought cannot be reduced to the brain function or to the 
brain localisation. Despite its advances, it is still possible to recognise various limitations, both 
methodological and epistemic, in the field of so-called neurolaw. 
The limits of neurolaw are not solely methodological 
Today, the limitations of neurolaw are apparent in two areas: the methodologies used and its 
epistemological ambitions. Various authors have recently addressed this issue. Some, such as 
Pardo and Patterson (2013), find that there are insurmountable difficulties in neurolaw, while 
others, such as Robins and Craver (2011) and Levy (2014), recognise the current deficiencies 
and are working to show neurolaw’s logic and potential contribution. To examine the main 
difficulties exposed by the cases presented, we focus on four aspects that we believe illustrate 
some of the issues that should be addressed in the future development of this field. 
The first aspect concerns the limitations of technology. Can situations controlled in a 
laboratory be compared with the real situations considered in court? In other words, can we 
expect the human brain to respond in the same way in both situations? Can neuroscience clearly 
distinguish evil from psychosis in judicial trials, i.e., the “mad and bad question”? (Vincent, 
2010, pp. 93-94). Does the P300-MERMER test really have nearly 99.9% reliability? Even if it 
does have this level of reliability, does it only apply to what is being measured, or can it also 
determine whether an accused is guilty? Dr. Farwell frequently alludes to his experiment’s 
reliability: “With both P300 and P300-MERMER, error rate was 0%: determinations were 
100% accurate, no false negatives or false positives; also no indeterminates” (Farwell et.al., 
2013, p. 263); “less than 1% to characterize the error rate in studies where in fact a 0% error rate 
was obtained. In addition to 0% error rate, Farwell and Smith also reported 0% indeterminates” 
(Farwell et.al., 2013, p. 264). Does this small rate of error refer only to the recognition of 
stimuli in the experiment, or does it also refer to an infallible method of detecting those guilty of 
a crime? The mere recognition of sensory stimuli should not be the basis for greater punishment 
or to convict someone of a crime. The recognition of these sensory signals as well as variations 
in neural signals can be useful in assisting investigations for judicial proceedings, such as in 
finding the body of Marta del Castillo, who was murdered and then thrown into the sea. In this 
case the murderer, Miguel Carcaño, was shown many images of different locations; the P-300 
MERMER revealed that his brain only responded to the image of one of those places, namely, 
where he had hidden the body of the victim. Jumping from the recognition of a stimulus to the 
conclusion that a person is guilty requires an insurmountable argumentative leap that reduces 
moral and legal argumentative capacity to nil, giving all of the weight to neuroscientific 
interpretation. In this sense, as García-Marzá explains regarding neuropolitics but that we 
believe can also be applied to the field of neurolaw, we are confronting a new “neuropower”: 
“We are facing what has been called ‘neuropower,’ referring to the substantial applications of 
this new form of power/knowledge. This is neuroscientific discovery at the service of politics,” 
(García-Marzá, 2012, p. 84). In this case, the usefulness of these neuroscientific discoveries is 
not only political but also legal. 
The second aspect that must be addressed is temporal limitation. Neuroimages only 
contribute information about the brain in its current state, which means that there is a temporal 
limit, and the neural state of the accused at the time of a crime cannot be shown. Therefore, it 
cannot be known whether the pathology currently visible is the result of the crime, previous to 
it, or subsequent to it (Vincent, 2010, p. 95). Regarding this temporal distance and specifically 
the predictive role of fMRI in judicial proceedings, Crawford argues that if one wants to predict 
whether someone is going to break the law in the future, a brain image is no better than a past 
recording of the individual’s behaviour. In fact, a recording is more predictive because there is 
weak evidence linking future behaviour and brain abnormalities (Crawford, 2008, p. 76). 
The third aspect is that the jump from an informative to a prescriptive role is too large a 
leap and requires ethical and philosophical reflection. It is one thing to study or determine that 
decision-making ability is on occasion influenced by certain neural parameters in which genes, 
the environment, and our brains play a role. It is entirely different to determine that human free 
will is a fiction (Libet, 1999; Morse, 2004; Rubia, 2009). 
The fourth aspect is that, independently of whether functional neuroimaging is considered 
irrefutable or informative evidence, its mere consideration in judicial proceedings would 
completely change the structure of courts and their advisors. The introduction of experts (or 
metaexperts) into the courts would be indispensable (Farisco, 2014, p. 2). These experts would 
have to go beyond legal knowledge and incorporate neuroscience. The discussion of the Italian 
cases directly shows that the interpretation of neuroimages varies according to interests. In those 
cases, the defence used the same empirical evidence to defend its interests against the 
prosecution. If the same tests that produce the neuroimages are treated in a radically opposite 
manner to determine whether an action was carried out freely and voluntarily, then their 
potential effect is merely hypothetical and not experimental. As Gazzaniga states: 
 (…) so psychiatrists and brain scientists might be able to tell us what someone’s mental 
state or brain condition is but cannot tell us (without being arbitrary) when someone has 
too little control to be held responsible. The issue of responsibility (…) is a social 
choice (Gazzaniga, 2005, p. 101). 
While we disagree with the last part of this quote because responsibility is not only a social 
issue but also a moral and legal issue, his reflection on the role of neuroscientists is correct. 
Gazzaniga places “without being arbitrary” in parentheses and notes the interests that influence 
the interpretation of neuroimages, as seen in the Italian cases. Neuroscience’s arbitrariness noted 
by Gazzaniga was also referenced by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests regarding 
the fact that science is not neutral and always has an interest with three orientations: technical, 
practical, and emancipatory. These three aspects of science always reciprocally need each other 
(Habermas, 1971). It is in this vein that we believe neurolaw should advance, as a contribution 
that strengthens our technical understanding and knowledge of human beings and their 
variability and that allows for the orientation of decisions linked to law (in its elaboration and 
application) with the goal and aspiration of human emancipation. Neurolaw should therefore not 
be viewed as an objective science, above all because those who develop and apply neurolaw 
already possess interests that define its function, development, use, and social pre-eminence. 
The entry of neuroscience in the courtroom is seen by some authors as a window of new 
advantages (Green & Cohen, 2004; Goodenough, 2001). They argue, for example, that 
neuroscience could provide evidence for the existence of unconscious bias on the part of the 
judge, jury, lawyers, etc. Sometimes they underline other virtues such as its potential to report 
on the reliability of memory or perception in testimonies, and even the reliability of a 
confession. However, there is an important difference in considering neuroscience as an adviser 
and helper―which can provide some evidence―and in saying that these tests can and should 
determine a defendant’s liability.  
We consider that there is an epistemological and methodological leap, that there is a 
pretence of neuroscience objectivity and normativity to neurolaw in this case. The implication is 
that from those objectivistic positions neurolaw is shown as a new power which could even 
determine criminal liability. As we have tried to argue, functional neuroimaging may come 
close to assisting in the legal field with the initial functions we mention, as a counsellor or 
helper, but not by fully determining a defendant’s guilt, as has been claimed in the cases of J. 
Grinder, T. Herrington, or A. Losilla. That position will be maintained from the discourse ethics 
tradition where the principle of justice implies an interaction with the other as recognition and 
the consideration of freedom, responsibility and intentionality as transcendental properties from 
the environment (Habermas, 2008). 
Emergentist mind as a starting point for neurolaw 
In order to discuss the ethical assumptions maintained in this paper we can say that the 
implications that neuroscience may―or may not―have in the conception of law will depend on 
the concept we have of the mind-brain relationship. And in this vein an emergentist point of 
view is a cautious and advisable position, as we will argue. 
If the conception is materialistic then the identification of mind with brain can give the 
impression that neuroscience will change the fundamental assumptions of the law, when in fact 
it will not. There is no doubt that neuroscience is changing our understanding of the brain, but 
we should not confuse the brain basis with the basic foundations of social science (Cortina, 
2011, pp. 94-96). Understanding the neural basis of human behaviour does not allow “brain 
being” to shift to “legal duty” and that human action cannot be explained solely by physical 
criteria. 
Thus the materialistic conception of the brain and mind poses several problems. First, there 
is a confusion between the conceptual-normative and the empirical, or rather, there is an 
identification of the conceptual-normative with the supposedly empirical. The central interest 
for neuroscience is what affects the neural structure, brain function and physiological bases. 
And these brain functions are translated into a language that is commonly understood to be 
“empirical” because hypotheses are tested through experimentation. However, to truly connect 
with the empirical concept, neurosciences should clearly identify the conceptual part. Mind, 
memory, emotion and conscience are examples of such concepts, which are not defined in a 
unified way in the neuroscientific field. It therefore becomes difficult to find the physiological 
bases of what has not yet been clearly defined. The reduction of mind to brain seems to simplify 
this problem, because the conceptual is defined by the empirical for the neural bases and the 
brain localisation. However, this reductionist impulse always explains the mind as something 
mechanical and causally determined (Pardo and Patterson, 2011, p. 13). 
Moreover this materialistic position leads to incurring in the mereological fallacy that M. 
Bennett and P. Hacker explain in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003). This 
fallacy attributes the capacity or function to a part that can only be properly attributed to the 
combined total of which it is part. According to this view the psychological and moral attributes 
of individuals, such as responsibility, intention, and decision-making are not localised in the 
brain, but are perceptible through people’s behaviour during their lifetime. 
Past techniques such as the polygraph and the P-300 MERMER used today share the 
common assumption that lying involves stable and detectable neurological correlates (Pardo & 
Patterson, 2011, p. 19). In all the cases cited above, the use of this technique has been made 
from this assumption and therefore from a materialist view of the mind. The application of this 
technique, from this perspective, incurs in the problems discussed above, that is, the confusion 
between the conceptual and the empirical, and consequently the mereological fallacy. 
The attempt to detect lying with an EEG implies that humans store information in their 
brain, like a computer. In this case it would be unlikely to fail to recognise a visual or auditory 
stimulus, and variation in the brain-wave pattern would inform us whether it recognises it or 
not. Detecting lies with this and other techniques is controversial, however. Conceptually, the 
lie adheres to human behaviour and not to neurological evidence. At most, a piece of 
neuroscientific evidence could provide a link between the lying behaviour and a certain brain 
state, thus providing an inductive proof of a lie (Pardo & Patterson, 2011, p. 21), but it could 
never give a measure of lies (Monteleone et al., 2009). It would therefore be wrong to say that 
neuroscience has the potential to reveal the lies that occur in an area of the brain. 
Instead of this materialist mind―localisationist and deterministic―perhaps another idea 
could help further the dialogue between neuroscience and law. This would be an idea which 
does not imply that the concept of the mind is necessarily measurable and physical. In fact the 
mind implies that human beings have a certain rationality which relates to thought, emotion and 
action. Its most immediate manifestation consists of a set of skills, abilities and competencies 
which obviously interact in the brain, but are not causally determined by it; rather, they emerge 
from it. The emergentist conception of the brain helps us to understand that the structures and 
human capacities are irreducible to the properties of its components. It affirms the systematic 
development of new properties. In the case of humans these are transcendental properties 
(liberty, responsibility, intentionality among others) because they allow us to go beyond the 
average of any other animal species and become human life itself. These capabilities arise from 
the processes of neural activity, but may not be limited to them only. 
When the emergentist mind is taken as a starting point, the expectations of the 
contributions neuroscience can make to the law will be considerably reduced. A power that is 
not justified is therefore not granted. However, we are not saying here that neuroscience has 
nothing to say to the law. Neural structures are obviously necessary in the study of human 
capabilities, and neuroscience can help to describe their operations, but not the skills base and 
human behaviour arising from them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The six cases presented refer to three types of proceedings in which evidence using 
neuroimaging techniques and electroencephalograms have been considered in very different 
ways. The two US cases refer to the direct acceptance of Brain Fingerprinting or P300-
MERMER as direct exonerative and incriminating evidence. The two Spanish cases refer to the 
indirect and secondary acceptance of the P300-MERMER as evidence in criminal cases. This 
technique was also used as an investigative tool to find the victims’ bodies. Finally, the two 
Italian cases show the disparity in interpretations of the same functional neuroimages in the 
debate over free will and conscious decision-making ability. 
The six cases analysed show that neuroimaging techniques and their results have been 
accepted as evidence in judicial proceedings on various occasions. While up to this point there 
have been no changes to the judicial system―something that Greene and Cohen in fact 
seek―this type of evidence has been used to incriminate or exonerate alleged criminals. In our 
opinion, the use of electroencephalograms or neuroimaging can be useful as complementary 
evidence in an investigation but will create very negative moral consequences if used as primary 
evidence in sentencing. As noted by Vincent, before being used in any capacity, a unified 
neuroscientific concept of responsibility is needed, as well as an awareness of the implications 
of the use of these techniques.  
There is a logical and moral limitation to the use of these techniques because an individual 
cannot completely share the experience of another without becoming that person. This 
distinction introduces a filter, an interpretation that individualises respective points of view. In 
other words, by virtue of our separateness, we have a private room that cannot logically be 
violated: the room of our mind. The presence of this logical limitation does not say anything 
about the expanse of our private life, unless it is non-existent. It also does not mean that our 
inalienable intimacy cannot be extremely small. However, it does not imply that we should not 
have privileged access to our experiences: the fact that there is an essential deficiency in 
whatever knowledge one person can have about another does not mean that there must be a 
deficiency in one’s own self-understanding. On the contrary, these techniques suggest that a 
neuroimage or electric wave variation in the brain could provide more information about a 
subject than can be obtained from simple argumentative introspection. The use of these 
techniques to condemn or exonerate an alleged criminal is, at the very least, dangerous. 
If there comes a moment in which the use of neuroscientific evidence becomes generalised 
in criminal proceedings, we will confront a new form of “neuropower”. In the context of 
neurolaw, interpretations from the scientific community of supposedly empirical and objective 
results would take precedence over discursive arguments in judicial proceedings to determine 
free will, responsibility, and even human liberty. What would then be the difference between a 
society that prefers to directly attack the capacity for making decisions even before they are 
made and a society that uses neurotechnology a posteriori to determine whether a decision was 
made consciously and freely? Free will in people’s decision making cannot be omitted or 
eliminated by the weight of other variables as neuroimaging evidence. 
Finally, an emergentist point of view is less problematic than the reductionist materialist 
viewpoint because has fewer limitations. It is certainly problematic that neuroscience tells us 
what the brain thinks, believes, feels or intends to do, because it is people who have these 
capabilities. These capabilities arise from neural processes, but cannot be confined to them. The 
neural activity is necessary but not sufficient. As M. Gazzaniga (2011, pp. 217-219) noted in 
this regard, people make an abstraction that occurs when a mind emerges from the brain, and it 
interacts with the living environment. This abstraction is what provides the transcendental 
moment in the human dimension, and makes us human beings―we would add ethical human 
beings―and not governed solely by the laws of nature. 
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